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Abstract 
Prior to the requirement for performance-based contracting, the government 
structured its acquisition regulations and business practices in a way that resulted 
primarily in transactional exchanges between the government and industry.  The 
transition to performance-based contracting has created the need for the 
government to better understand how to both design and govern long-term 
relationships with their suppliers.  This study develops a conceptual model that 
provides a framework for assessing how knowledge of variables such as 
environmental uncertainty, task stability, technology application certainty, risk, and 
transaction-specific investments impact the selection of the optimal mode of 
governance.  Our model views governance alternatives along a continuum ranging 
from short-term transactional exchanges to more long-term relations exchanges.  
Moreover, our model predicts the circumstance under which various governance 
alternatives would be optimal.  Finally, we use data from several ACAT I programs to 
assess the validity of selected components of the model and to assess the impact of 
governance type on program outcomes. 
Keywords: Performance-based contracting, conceptual model, knowledge of 
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Introduction 
 The goal of any system is to fulfill the particular mission for which it was 
designed (Blanchard, 1967).  For the Department of Defense (DoD), the first step in 
meeting that goal is deciding which weapon systems will best support their missions 
and then decide which contractors are capable of developing these systems in a 
cost-effective manner.  Peck and Scherer (1962) identified three basic steps in the 
development of a weapon system: (1) the government’s decision to initiate a 
weapons program, (2) the selection of the contractor, and (3) the acquisition of the 
program through development and production activities.  Although comprehensive in 
terms of acquisition, these steps do not cover the sustainment strategies for these 
systems once fielded. 
Historically, the acquisition and sustainment strategies have been treated as 
separate and not necessarily equal concerns in U.S. defense acquisitions (Arrol, 
1993; Gruber, 1999).  Legacy acquisition strategies focused on the acquisition of 
technology and systems, whereas the sustainment of those systems received 
considerably less attention.  As a result, an imbalance existed between acquisition 
and sustainment, which led to more emphasis being placed on technological 
development rather than on the long-term performance of the system once fielded 
(i.e., system effectiveness).  Almost intuitively, legacy contracting strategies were 
aligned such that the incentives given to the contractor only focused on meeting the 
short-term specifications of acquisition. Creating incentives that meet the needs of 
the government at a faster production rate, at a cheaper price, and at a higher 
quality are all economically responsible constructs when acquiring a system; 
conjointly, the government should have been developing incentives that would have 
encouraged the contractor to develop adequate systems for meeting the recurring 
long-term demands (i.e., replacement, replenishment, etc.) of the customer on the 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 2 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Although there were many risks associated with the legacy contracting 
strategy, we identified two major risks that are pertinent to the discussion at hand.  
Rogerson (1994) argued that roughly 30% of the total defense budget is devoted to 
acquisition.  This means that the remaining 70% is required to sustain these systems 
over their forecasted life cycles; therefore, more attention needs to be placed on 
writing contracts that better serve the long-term sustainment needs of the 
government.  Second, many researchers have argued that legacy contracting 
strategies (i.e., complex formal contacts), such as those used in defense 
acquisitions, tend to undermine trust and encourage the opportunistic behavior 
among buyers and sellers that contracts are designed to discourage (Ghoshal and 
Moran, 1996; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).   
To reconcile this unbalanced perception of acquisition and sustainment (see 
Figure 1), the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) mandated a modernization 
of the defense acquisition process, and one of the results, among other things, was 
the implementation of a new sustainment strategy that came to be known as 
performance-based logistics (PBL).  The formal adoption of PBL caused a shift in 
both the acquisition and sustainment environments; more specifically, the 
sustainment environment transitioned from production-driven objectives to outcome-
driven objectives.  This implied that contractor performance became the driving force 
behind the new sustainment strategy.  In order to meet the requirements of the new 
sustainment strategy, program offices needed to better understand how to design 
and govern long-term relationships with their suppliers, which could help them 
potentially fight off opportunistic behavior, if structured correctly.    
The focus of this study is centered around the practical impact of this strategic 
shift on the program manager, who now faces a two-fold challenge.  The first 
challenge is how to select the appropriate governance structure for a particular 
supplier given several variables, such as the type of relationship that currently exists 
between the contractor and the supplier, the complexity of the part (or system) being 
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risk attributable to transaction-specific assets.  The second challenge is deciding 
what are the appropriate contractual and/or non-contractual incentives that will allow 
the government to gain the most efficient and effective performance of that part or 
system.  In this paper, we focus on providing a framework that reflects the needs 
that are created by the first challenge.   
In terms of legacy frameworks, many scholars have relied on the theories of 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) and relational exchange theory, 
which is rooted in contact law (Macneil, 1980), to provide the frameworks needed for 
assessing the most appropriate mechanisms to govern exchanges between buyers 
and sellers (Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, & Simpson, 1992; Cannon, Achrol, & 
Gundlach, 2000).  This study follows the logic of Macneil’s (1980) theory of relational 
exchange and Cannon et al.’s (2000) plural form governance approach and posits 
that the merging of these two literatures provides a framework that supports the 
option for more relational exchanges in defense contracting given this PBL 
environment.  To illustrate the merging of these two frameworks, we present a 
conceptual model that displays a “contractual continuum” going from formal 
contracting mechanisms, as defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 
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Background 
U.S. Defense Industry.  The 1990s were a perfect storm of technological 
change, consolidation, budget downturns, environmental uncertainty, and the 
embrace of specialization over conglomeration (Chao, 2005).  With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the “Reagan Build-up” was seen as a huge 
excess of industrial capacity.  Senior leaders at the Pentagon began forcing the 
various defense contractors to think strategically about their long-term positions in 
the defense industry.  This marked the beginning of an industry-wide consolidation 
of the defense supplier base.  The combination of a consolidated defense supplier 
base coupled with the 21st century shift toward the acquisition of capability (i.e., PBL) 
rather than platforms has created new challenges for both the supply side and the 
demand side of the defense industry (Kebede, Maytorena, Lowe, & Winch, 2009).  
These new challenges require program managers to be more acutely aware of the 
many variables that can affect a contractor’s decision as to whether they can do 
business with the government.   
One variable for a contractor to consider is that although the U.S. defense 
industrial base has been a source of long-term competitive advantage for the United 
States, from an industrial perspective, the defense industry is a very cyclical market.  
Peaks and troughs, in terms of spending, have long existed in the defense industry.  
From 1948–2007, volatility was most common in procurement, while personnel, 
research and development (R&D), and operating costs experienced steady, long-
term growth (CSBA, 2009).  Specifically, as a result of these peaks and troughs in 
procurement, the defense industrial supplier base has experienced significant 
demand volatility.  Thus, a contractor must take into account the cyclical nature of 
the defense industry and weigh the risk of possible termination after significant R&D 
investments have been made. 
Second, defense contractors face lower margins relative to peer industries—
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contractors, lower margins are a result of heavy internal R&D investments and only 
having one buyer.  Many defense contractors have been able to deal with lower 
margins by implementing strategies that lower the risk of discontinuation.  Traditional 
methods of lowering risk have been to spread manufacturing plants to different 
congressional districts, longer term contracts, and R&D being paid for by the 
government, to name a few.  Contractors have also been able to improve their cash 
margins by cutting costs associated with transaction-specific assets and other forms 
of investments, such as research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E).  
During the Cold War, defense firms invested 4% of their revenue in R&D; today that 
number is 1.5%.  Another way contractors have chosen to deal with lower margins is 
to increase foreign military sales (FMS) by creating commercial spinoffs that are 
marketable to the general public as well as to other countries.   
Lastly, an important issue is being able to take into account the various 
differences between the public sector and the private sector.  One difference is 
organizational goals.  According to Pierre Chao (2005), 
There are fundamental disconnects in the defense industry: the primary one 
being the tension between public goods and private ends.  Corporations want 
high returns and as much of a monopoly position as possible.  The public 
wants the highest quality but cheapest possible defense.   
Another difference is the overall market structure of the defense industry (Dehoog, 
1990; Driessnack & King, 2004; Peck & Scherer, 1962).  For example, the FAR 
(2010) defines the procedures and guidelines on everything from what can be 
bought, to source selection, to contractual terms and conditions, to the disclosure of 
information, to socioeconomic factors, to how government contracts are to be 
executed, etc.  Having to adhere to the FAR (2010) requires a myriad of government 
personnel and agencies to be constantly documenting and evaluating their means of 
complying with these procedures.  However, outside of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), these issues are not so strictly defined in the private 
sector.  Ultimately, the private sector has the choice of whether to subject 
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with the government, whereas the government is bound by these regulations 
whether they in-source or outsource. 
Acquisition Strategy Evolution.  Prior to the 1960s, a formal defense 
acquisition policy did not exist, due largely to the fact that the powers of the 
Secretary of Defense were limited.  The first major strategic acquisition move was 
made by Secretary Robert McNamara in 1964 with the issuance of DoD Directive 
3200.9.  This directive was the implementation of an Air Force procedure that 
divided the acquisition cycle into three phases: (1) the Concept Formulation Phase, 
(2) the Contract Definition Phase, and (3) the Acquisition Phase (Smith & 
Friedmann, 1980).  During the Concept Formulation Phase, a decision was rendered 
about whether a system was needed based on paper cost-effective studies.  During 
the Contract Definition Phase, contractors put together proposals that included 
design specifications, cost, and scheduling information for accomplishing the 
Acquisition Phase.  Once the preliminary analyses (which were mostly only on 
paper) were complete, a proposal was selected and a contract was awarded for 
development and production.     
The second major strategic move occurred in 1971 when David Packard 
issued DoD Directive 5000.1, Acquisition of Major Defense Systems, which 
consolidated most of his major acquisition changes into a single document.  Two of 
the most critical improvements were (1) the institutions of milestones that had to be 
met as the program progressed through the acquisition process and (2) a formal 
reporting standard for the program manager.  In terms of the strategy itself, there 
were three milestones employed under this directive: Milestone 1, Program Initiation, 
which occurred after early conceptual efforts; Milestone II, Full-scale Development, 
which occurred once there was sufficient evidence and confidence that program 
worth and readiness warranted a commitment of resources; and Milestone III, 
Production/Deployment, which was approved by the Secretary once the program 
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From 1971–1987, several clauses (most of which were a direct result of the 
Packard Commission in 1987) were added to DoDD 5000.1 to deal with legacy 
procedural issues that were deemed problematic and costly.  Yet, from an 
acquisition strategy standpoint, the establishment of two new milestones (Milestone 
IV and Milestone V) in the 1987 version was one of the most significant additions to 
DoDD 5000.1.  The Milestone IV review takes place one to two years after initial 
deployment to assure operational readiness.  The Milestone V review takes place 
five to 10 years after initial deployment to determine the state of operational 
effectiveness and to identify upgrade needs.  These milestones were a direct 
response to the criticisms that too little attention was paid to life-cycle implications of 
new systems (Ferrara, 1996).  As a result, these milestones created the ability not 
only to see but also to understand the full acquisition life cycle, which allowed the 
government to assess more accurately the overall health of defense programs. 
In 1994, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) mandated the use 
of contractor past performance data when awarding contracts and encouraged 
contracting officers to purchase commercial off-the-shelf products, as opposed to 
investing heavily in the creation of government-only products.  The Clinger–Cohen 
Act of 1996 (an extension of the FASA) sought to loosen some of the restrictions 
placed on the acquisition policy by previous versions (Pegnato, 2003).  The formal 
adoption of Performance-based Logistics (PBL) in 2001 marked another paradigm 
shift in the overall acquisition strategy.  This new strategy essentially purchased 
outcomes whose path for meeting required objectives was determined by the 
awarded contractor, which created a hands-off approach as to how the government 
acquired new systems.   
These examples highlight some of the many revisions that have been made 
to the federal acquisition laws.  One of the key points to take away from this section 
is that each revision has stressed the importance of centralized policy-making and 
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Complexity.  In the defense industry, complexity has been defined as a 
product of three overarching dimensions—technical, organizational, and 
environmental (Drezner, 2007).  For the handful of systems-integrating, Tier 1 
defense contractors, several facets of complexity increase as the government 
pushes the capabilities needed for tomorrow’s combat systems.  For example, 
technical complexity increases as combat systems move toward net-centric 
capabilities, while organizational complexity increases as Tier 1 contractors 
subcontract out for various components that are part of the system being developed.  
As complexity grows, these dimensions have a more substantial impact on a 
contractor’s ability to meet contractual requirements.  When dealing with complexity, 
Drezner (2009) argued that the magnitude of system evolution should determine the 
level of oversight needed to sufficiently and efficiently manage a particular system; 
therefore, as complexity grows, so must the level of oversight because the impact of 
the complexity is too great to be passively managed. 
Being able to understand the degree of complexity at any one particular point 
in time for any one particular program and the potential impact of that complexity 
requires a more intimate understanding of the program being analyzed.  As an 
example, if the program office for the AH-64 Apache helicopter wants to understand 
all of the variables surrounding the lead-times for new transmissions, it must first 
understand the complexity associated with that part.  The technical aspects (e.g., the 
estimated number of flight hours, the physical weight, etc.), the organizational 
aspects (e.g., the procurement lead-times for the various components, the location 
of manufacturers, the Army’s supply chain, the logistics of the Army’s supply chain, 
etc.), and the environmental aspects (e.g., war versus peacetime, defense budget 
constraints, etc.) must all be taken into consideration in order for the program office 
to determine how to better manage this subsystem. 
Project Success.  The questions regarding how project success is defined 
and what the prime variables are that impact a firm’s ability to be successful have 
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Dyer, 1979; Dvir Lipovetsky, Shenhar, & Tishler, 2003; Freeman & Beale, 1992; 
Pinto & Slevin, 1987, 1988).  A subset of these scholars have applied these 
questions to defense acquisitions in order to identify what variables have an impact 
on a defense contractor’s ability to be successful (Lipovetsky, Tishler, Dvir, & 
Shenhar, 1997; Sadeh, Dvir, & Shenhar, 2000; Tishler, Dvir, Shenhar, & Lipovetsky, 
1996; Tubig & Abetti, 1990).  Tubig and Abetti (1990) analyzed the effects of four 
endogenous variables on contractor performance—type of R&D, type of solicitation, 
type of contract, and size of the contractor—and found that all but the size of the 
contractor had an effect on some of the specified performance variables (technical, 
schedule, quality, cost, and overall assessment).  Tishler et al. (1996) analyzed 110 
Israeli defense projects and derived 20 success measures that were then 
assimilated using a multivariate technique.  All of the major results of their study 
pointed toward relationships as being the glue that held these projects together.  
Therefore, it is intuitive to suggest that there could be a mix of legal (Tubig & Abetti, 
1990) and non-legal (Tishler et al., 1996) governing mechanisms that are driving the 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 11 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
Theories of Governance 
Transaction Cost Economics.  Transaction cost economics (TCE) focuses 
on the differences between transactional, hybrid, and hierarchical governance 
structures and the conditions that would lead managers to craft appropriate 
governance structures to accommodate known exchange hazards such as 
investments in assets that are unique to a particular exchange, difficulty in 
performance measurement, and uncertainty.   
“Transaction cost economics assumes that human agents are subject to 
bounded rationality, whence behavior is ‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so’ 
(Simon, 1961, p. xxiv), and are given to opportunism” (Williamson, 1985).  The term 
bounded rationality stems from Herbert Simon’s behavioral theory, which states that 
individuals face uncertainty about the future as well as about costs in acquiring 
information in the present.  According to the theory, these two issues limit the extent 
to which one can make rational decisions, which forces an individual to make 
satisficing, not maximizing, decisions.   
This, however, is not the view that New Institutional Economists take on the 
effect of bounded rationality.  Whereas Simon argued that uncertainty forces 
individuals to make satisficing decisions, New Institutional Economists argue that 
uncertainty gives rise to opportunistic (i.e., self-interested or maximizing) decisions.  
Williamson (1985) defined opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile,” which 
causes there to be an “incomplete or distorted disclosure of information.”  It is the 
combination of bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior that Williamson 
identified as being the root cause of transaction costs.   
One element that must be understood when using TCE to explain certain 
market behaviors is the type of market at hand.  Several scholars have cautioned 
against applying traditional assumptions of a price-driven market to the defense 
industry (Peck & Scherer, 1962; etc.).  In a traditional market system, decisions 
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decentralized.   The seller takes the initiative in deciding what to produce, how to 
fund the effort, and what price to charge.  The buyer decides whether to purchase 
the seller’s product at the stated price or to purchase a product that is being offered 
by a competitor at a lower price (Peck & Scherer, 1962).  The defense market, 
however, functions differently than a traditional market because the government 
operates as a monopsony, which means that the government is not only the sole 
buyer but also the regulator of the market.  According to Driessnack and King 
(2004), “government represents an active institution in the defense industry, and 
institutions contribute to market structure by defining transaction costs.” 
Hazards to Exchange.  Within the context of TCE, scholars have defined 
three categories of exchange hazards that require contractual safeguards: (1) asset 
specificity, (2) difficulty of measurement, and (3) uncertainty.  We believe that 
overlap exists among these three hazards, which is to say that two or three hazards 
could happen conjointly or the existence of one hazard could be the cause of 
another.  For example, high levels of uncertainty about the direction of a major 
weapon system (MWS) could make it difficult for a contractor to evaluate whether 
transaction-specific investments for that MWS would be profitable in the foreseeable 
future. 
Asset specificity arises as sourcing relationships require significant 
relationship-specific investments in physical and/or human assets (Poppo & Zenger, 
2002).  Empirical analysis demonstrates that as asset specificity increases, the 
complexity of contracts also increases (Joskow, 1988).  Williamson (1985) 
addressed asset specificity in the following manner: “Failure to support transaction-
specific assets with protective governance structures predictably result in costly 
haggling and maladaptiveness.”  This maladaptive effect is a constant worry for most 
defense contractors.  For example, a major IT defense firm might be leery of making 
heavy investments in transaction-specific assets because as technology rapidly 
evolves, the need for those assets diminishes due to obsolescence.  Difficulty of 
measurement arises when a contractor’s level of performance cannot be objectively 
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productivity.  Given this scenario, there is a higher probability that both parties could 
have incentives to limit their efforts toward fulfilling the agreements because they are 
defined in the contract.  Uncertainty requires parties to adapt to future issues that 
occur as a result of unforeseen changes.  Uncertainty within the defense industry 
arises for various reasons.  One of the most critical issues surrounding the defense 
industry is the cyclical funding issue, which leaves the contractor at the mercy of the 
defense budget.  Given these exchange hazards, managers either choose to 
vertically integrate or to construct complex contracts that define a systematic 
process for dealing with uncertain outcomes.   
Relational Exchange Theory.  Relational exchange theory focuses on the 
contracting norms and shared expectations that exist in both discrete and relational 
exchanges (Macneil, 1980).  Our argument concerning the types of transactions that 
exist between a contractor and the government follows closely with Macneil’s view 
that the types of exchange form a continuum that moves from discrete (i.e., 
transactional) to relational (i.e., long term, continuous) exchanges (Macneil, 1978).  
Macneil identified three general contracting norms: solidarity, role integrity, and 
mutuality.  Solidarity is what holds exchanges together (discrete = contract law, 
relational = internalized social norms).  Role integrity reflects the expectations of 
each party (discrete = only focused on the transaction, relational = focused on 
transactions and other issues not directly associated with the transactions).  
Mutuality speaks to the need for an even distribution that assures adequate returns 
for each party (transactional = focused on returns received from individual 
transactions, relational = undifferentiated returns; Kaufmann & Stern, 1988).   
The characteristics of these general contracting norms, however, are only 
partially captured in the types of contractual mechanisms used by the government.  
For example, in the case of solidarity, the FAR (2010) does not require the 
government to stay with a contractor when it is not in its best interest (FAR, 2010, 
49.101); therefore, theoretically, government–contractor solidarity only exists to the 
extent that the government needs a particular system, part, or service from a 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 14 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
contractor in the future.  However, because the majority of Major Defense 
Acquisition Program (MDAP) contracts are awarded to the same Tier 1 group of 
suppliers, we believe that these general contracting norms will manifest themselves 
because there is an ongoing relationship.   
  Plural Form Governance.  The development of this plural form approach 
has come about as a result of the difficulty of infusing economic and relational 
theories.  According to Bradach and Eccles (1989), exchanges are best understood 
as being embedded in a complex matrix of economic, social, and political structures 
and that governance relies on combinations of market, social, and/or authority-based 
mechanisms, more than any one of these exclusively.  Plural form governance uses 
a combination of legal and non-legal conventions to govern exchanges while taking 
into account the market structure in which these exchanges are taking place.  A 
basic assumption here is that exchanges will be ongoing, not transactional, and that 
by having continual exchanges, relational norms will begin to develop, which 
discourages self-interested behavior in favor of satisfying mutual interests (Achrol & 
Gundlach, 1999).  Cannon et al. (2000) concluded that when transactional 
uncertainty is high, plural form governance enhances a defense contractor’s ability 
to meet expected performance targets.  If effectively managed, the use of plural form 
governance in the defense industry would provide the flexibility and adaptability 
needed to deal with future uncertainties, which would otherwise inhibit a contractor’s 
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Governing Mechanisms & Strategies 
Contract Types (see Appendix A).  According to FAR (2010) 3.101-1, the 
federal government is responsible for conducting business in a manner that is visible 
and unambiguous; therefore, formal contracts enable the government to satisfy the 
visibility criteria required in order to outsource for various products and/or services.  
When creating these formal contracts, it is important for the contracting officer to 
remember that contract type selection determines how cost risk is going to be 
allocated between the government and the contractor.  FAR (2010) 16.101(b) states 
that “contract types are grouped into two broad categories: fixed-price contracts and 
cost-reimbursement contracts.” 
It has long been understood that fixed-price contracts are the contractual 
mechanisms preferred by the government.  The reason is two-fold.  First, a fixed-
price contract “closely approximates the normal marketplace relationship between 
buyer and seller” (Lenk, 1977).  This is in line with the government’s vision of 
implementing an acquisition environment that functions more like the private sector.  
Second, there is no absorption of the cost risk associated with producing an end 
item by the government; therefore, the contractor assumes all of the cost risk 
associated with that end item.  Three of the most commonly used fixed-price 
contractual agreements are firm-fixed price (FFP), fixed-price-incentive-firm target 
(FPIF), and fixed-price-award-fee (FPAF).   
Firm-fixed price (FFP) contracts are used when the requirements for a 
particular project are well defined, which means that contractors are experienced in 
meeting requirements, market conditions are stable (or at least easily determined), 
and financial risks are otherwise insignificant.  The contractor is obliged to provide 
an acceptable deliverable at the time, price, and level of performance specified in 
the contract, and the incentive for the contractor is driven by a reduction in the cost 
of production.  These contracts are typically used when purchasing commercial 
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Fixed-price-incentive-firm target (FPIF) contracts are used when a ceiling 
price can be established that covers the most probable risks inherent in the nature of 
the work (ceiling price includes the following elements: target cost, target profit, 
delivery and quality, and a profit-sharing formula).  This type of contract is typically 
used when the amount of labor and materials required are unknown.  An FPIF 
construct is often used for the production of a major system based on a prototype.  
In other words, R&D has already gone into the creation of a prototype and low-rate 
initial production (LRIP) is the next step. 
Lastly, fixed-price-award-fee (FPAF) contracts are used to mitigate the risk 
that the user will not be satisfied because of judgmental acceptance criteria.  This 
type of contract is used when judgmental standards can be fairly applied by the fee-
determining official (the potential fee has to be large enough to provide a meaningful 
incentive for the contractor and to justify related administrative burdens).  Under this 
construct, the contractor not only has the incentive to realize an additional dollar of 
profit for every dollar that costs are reduced, but also he or she earns an additional 
fee for satisfying a set of specified performance standards. A typical application for 
FPAF contracts is performance-based service contracts. 
The other contractual category is cost reimbursement (C+).  Cost 
reimbursement, or cost plus, contracts have characteristics that are similar to FP 
contracts; however, the conditions associated with C+ contracts are different than 
those associated with FP contracts.  As with FP contracts, the seller (i.e., the 
contractor) is responsible for delivering an end item on time, on cost, and within a 
specified range of performance.  However, because there is a higher level of 
uncertainty associated with C+ contracts, the government agrees to assume a 
certain level of risk.  (The degree to which the government assumes risk can be 
seen as a ratio of government-funded R&D relative to contractor-funded R&D.)  The 
risk associated with C+ contracts can be attributed to several variables.  Some of the 
more prevalent variables are volatile market conditions, unstable labor force, 
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Within the C+ construct there are various contracts that are used for different 
reasons.  The more common types utilized are cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF), cost-plus-
incentive-fee (CPIF), and cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF).  A CPFF contract is the 
simplest of all of the C+ contracts.  A CPFF contract is designed to reimburse the 
contractor for the total allowable costs associated with R&D plus a fixed amount for 
the product(s) that the organization was contracted to provide.  CPFF contracts are 
typically used for conducting research studies. 
A CPIF contract is a more complex and often controversial construct that is 
often used when an objective relationship can be established between the fee and 
different measures such as actual costs, delivery dates, performance benchmarks, 
etc.  For example, a contractor bids on and is awarded a prototype missile contract; 
under a CPIF contract, the government will negotiate an initial fee for meeting a 
predetermined set of objectives.  That fee will be adjusted by a formula (which is 
based upon the relationship of target costs to actual costs and/or target performance 
to actual performance) once that contract has been satisfied.  Therefore, the fees 
associated with a CPIF contract are contingent upon an organization’s ability to fulfill 
the specified needs of the government.  The controversy tends to appear when fees 
are determined based upon a set of measures that cannot be fully realized.  CPIF 
contracts are typically used for the R&D of a prototype for a major system.   
Lastly, a CPAF contract is inherently the most complex because it tends to be 
used when objective incentive targets are not feasible for critical aspects of 
performance.  In other words, CPAF contracts are issued because the objectives of 
the government are more broad, giving the contractor flexibility to interpret how to 
achieve those objectives.  For example, if the government believes that solar energy 
will become the preferred source of energy in the 21st century, then different 
agencies could award CPAF contracts with the objective of furthering the capabilities 
of solar technology.  The amount awarded would then be based on the contractor’s 
performance.  The award amount (which has a ceiling) is a pool of dollars that the 
contractor can earn by means of meeting the objectives specified in the contract, 
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contractor to perform well.  CPAF contracts are typically used for large-scale and/or 
exploratory research studies.   
Legacy Contracting.  Historically, contracting officers have developed short-
term focused contracts accompanied by complex statements of work that articulated 
how contractors were to achieve very specific outcomes.  This contracting strategy 
typically fosters transactional behavior in which each organization attempts to 
maximize its unique position on each individual transaction with little regard for long-
term consequences.  Another issue is the use of inappropriate, inadequate, and/or 
incomplete cost data for awarding contracts.  Under the leadership of Secretary 
McNamara, proposal cost estimates were used as the basis for awarding fixed-price 
contracts, which were believed to provide a better incentive for cost reduction and to 
require less government supervision.  In 1969, this strategy lost most of its validity 
when an OSD review found that costs were 79% higher and procurement lead-times 
were 32% longer than original estimates for the seven major weapon systems that 
were under review (Smith & Friedmann, 1980). 
There are two different methods for the government to procure goods: sealed 
bidding and negotiated procurement (Holtz, 1979).  Under the sealed bidding 
method, there is no assurance that the price given by the lowest bidder will be fair 
and reasonable.  Additionally, In-Gyu Kim (1998) found that sealed bidding runs a 
high risk of opportunistic behavior if an incumbent is concerned about losing the 
contract to an entrant. As for negotiated pricing, this typically occurs when the two 
parties have a close relationship and there is uncertainty. The parties come together 
to work out the price relative to risk, duration, etc. It gives each party an opportunity 
to set a clear understanding of the desired results and rewards. 
Performance-Based Contracting.  Performance-based contracts have been 
part of the contracting environment since 1991.  A basic tenet of performance-based 
contracting suggests that the people associated with the contracting process must 
recognize the potential long-term nature of the relationship between the government 
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capabilities into the formal contracts.  Given this new environment, the preferred 
performance-based contracting approach is long-term contracts; therefore, the DoD 
is not only investing in the acquisition of a product but also in a relationship.  
Rogerson (1994) argued that the DoD’s current long-term relational partnerships 
with major suppliers are similar to the relationships that large commercial firms have 
with their major suppliers.  There are specific examples of governments creating 
acquisition mechanisms that permit more integrated long-term relationship with 
suppliers.  For instance, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) instituted an IPT 
framework to support their capability acquisition programs that is rooted in relational 
contracting (MoD, 2005).  
Practically speaking, when a performance-based contract is drafted, all 
aspects of the acquisition, including the statement of work, are centered on the 
purpose of the work being performed, as opposed to how that work is executed.  
Additionally, quality-related evaluation factors are used not only as part of the source 
selection process, but also as part of the performance specifications. Most of these 
contracts have few metrics that define performance. The global metrics provide for a 
common understanding of what is desired. In turn, the contractor is free to choose 
the method of performance as long as the overall metrics are met. This provides an 
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Conceptual Development 
After thinking about these facets of defense acquisitions and contracting, one 
could conclude that using TCE as the remedy for various problems in the defense 
industry is difficult, due largely to the fact that TCE overstates the desirability of 
integration or instituting more contractual safeguards in exchange situations that are 
deemed hazardous (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  Following the traditional TCE 
framework, defense agencies craft complex contracts that define remedies for many 
contingencies, or specify processes for resolving unforeseeable outcomes, as a 
means of maintaining good relationships with their suppliers. In doing so, these 
complex contracts become more costly to craft, harder to monitor, and more difficult 
to enforce.  As an alternative, adopting a plural form governance structure would 
allow program managers to incorporate relational norms that would allow both 
parties to more easily adapt to future contingencies.   
Conceptual Model.  Formal contracts have not only served as the primary 
governing mechanism for acquiring products and/or services, but also as the primary 
means of relational governance.  Yet studies consistently report that the ability to 
perform is typically greater among organizations that use non-legal principles to 
govern the relationships among buyers and suppliers.  Our conceptual model (see 
Figure 2) aligns the alternative governance structures derived from transaction cost 
economics, normative structures derived from relational exchange theory, and plural 
form theory derived from the joining of these two frameworks in order to explain the 
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Figure 2. Conceptual Model 
Our vision is that the program manager, who is responsible for evaluating 
proposals submitted for major weapon systems, will be able to use this model to 
systematically evaluate the type of exchange and governance structures needed for 
these major weapon systems and determine what would be the optimal mix of legal 
(i.e., formal contracting) and non-legal (i.e., relational norms) principles in order to 
achieve the highest level of long-term, sustainable performance.  This model will 
also provide guidance for the types of exchange and governance structures needed 
given the type of relationship that currently exists between the government and the 
contractor.    
We suspect that by incorporating this model into the contractual decision-
making process, the government would develop more productive relationships with 
their suppliers and the contracts themselves would contain fewer legal bonds and 
exhibit more relational governance.  This model would also provide the program 
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objective manner.  In other words, the program manager would be able to 
systematically select a contractual mechanism and set of relational norms that 
correspond with that particular contractual mechanism in order to facilitate the ability 
to satisfy the contractually defined key performance parameters (KPPs). 
Propositions.  Many scholars have differing views as to the degree of impact 
formal contracts have on the government–contractor relationship, as well as on the 
overall level of success a contractor could achieve as a result of having formal 
contracts (Aldrich, 1979; Cannon et al., 2000; Child, 1972; Fehr, Gachter, & 
Kirchsteiger, 1997; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  Our 
preliminary assessment suggests that formal contracts alone cannot be seen as an 
efficient means for safeguarding against opportunistic behavior, specifically when 
high levels of complexity and uncertainty exist.  Therefore, we have the following 
propositions: 
1. Substituting certain legal norms found in formal acquisition and 
sustainment contracts with relational structures will enhance a Major 
Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) contractor’s ability to satisfy 
KPPs. 
2. By allowing for more relational norms, the program manager and 
contracting officer(s) gain greater flexibility to alter the means of 
governance when volatility increases because the overall complexity of 
the contracts is reduced. 
3. Because formal contracts are also inherently bounded in their 
rationality and cannot account for all future contingencies, it is 
imperative that more plural form governing strategies be incorporated 
into the contracting methodology of the defense industry. 
4. If managed correctly, relational arrangements supported by trust, 
commitment, collaboration, and information exchange can be viewed 
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Methodology 
Programs.  In order to test our theoretical model and evaluate our 
propositions, we are evaluating 16 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) 
that span the different Service branches: three programs were selected from the 
U.S. Army, three from the U.S. Air Force, five from the U.S. Navy, and five programs 
were classified as Joint Service Products (see Figure 3).  These programs also vary 
in terms of their functional capability area, technological needs, relational demands, 
and years in the Services.   
 
Figure 3. MDAP ACAT I Programs List 
Data.  Using contract data housed by the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS) coupled with performance data found in the Selected Acquisition Reports 
(SAR) housed by the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR) system, we are analyzing several variables that we believe can show the 
impact of the selected governing mechanisms on the overall performance of a 
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following: the contractor(s) selected for a program, contractor turnover, previous 
relationship versus new relationship, old technology versus new technology, no R&D 
versus R&D, type of contracts used at the various milestones, estimated duration of 
work for those contracts, actual duration of work on those contracts (if completed), 
contractual modifications, and dollar values for those contracts (see Appendix B). 
Data Issues.  After reviewing the types of data elements collected by the 
various publically available sources such as the Federal Procurement Data System 
(individual contract actions), Selected Acquisition Reports (overall program 
performance data), and www.defense.gov (contract announcement information), we 
began looking for ways to connect all three data sources and found no meaningful or 
consistent way to do so.  For example, one of the primary variables we were looking 
to analyze was the type of contractual mechanism used for a particular contract over 
time.  What we found was inconsistent inputs across the various data sources.  The 
offices responsible for inputting data into the FPDS appeared to be reporting 
inconsistent contractual mechanisms over time.  For example, between 2004 and 
2009, one F-22A contract experienced 13 contractual type changes, and although 
there were only two types used (CPFF and FFP), they were fundamentally different.  
Throughout the course of our research, we ran into countless circumstances that 
were similar to this one, which made it difficult to accurately assess what was really 
going on with any one particular contract. 
We gathered data elements for various known contract types (RDT&E, EMD, LRIP, 
etc.) that were written for all 16 programs.  Unfortunately, there was no foreseeable 
way to tie these individual data elements to the performance of the contracts 
because the publicly available performance data contained within a Selected 
Acquisition Report only looked at the overall performance of a system (i.e., schedule 
delays, cost overruns, etc.) not at how well a particular contract performed over time.  
The performance of an individual contract would need to be known in order for us to 
test our theoretical framework.  To remedy this dilemma, we accessed private data 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 27 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
Future Research 
One path to consider would be to analyze how certain relational norms might 
behave in the defense industry.  A specific research question might be, do certain 
relational norms permit, inhibit, or prohibit a contractor from being able to adapt to 
environmental changes?  If one sees that incorporating certain relational norms 
permits immediate adaptation, then those relational norms positively impact a 
contractor’s ability to adapt to environmental changes.  However, if one finds that 
incorporating certain relational norms inhibits or prohibits adaptation, then those 
relational norms negatively impact a contractor’s ability to adapt to environmental 
changes and could threaten a contractor’s ability to fulfill the terms specified in the 
contract. 
One thing to keep in mind is that it is important for contractors to recognize 
the current state of the armed Services when determining what variables matter 
when making risk-reducing decisions.  In peacetime, cost is the main goal and 
performance and schedule take a backseat.  In wartime, schedule and performance 
are the main goals and cost matters less.  These different goals could explain why 
programs experience cost and scheduling overruns at various times during their life 
cycles.  Therefore, an additional research objective could be to analyze whether a 
correlation exists between the current military state and the contractor’s ability to 
satisfy KPPs.  
One could assume that if relational arrangements really do act as substitutes 
for complex contracts, then it should be apparent that there has been a reduction in 
the complexity of the contracts written when reviewing contracts that have 
implemented relational governance methods.  Therefore, another interesting 
question for future research could seek to identify whether the complexity of 
contracts has been reduced as relational norms have been implemented.   
Another issue, which has been more controversial in recent years, has been 
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Accountability Office (GAO, known as the General Accounting Office until July 2004) 
has published several papers that highlight the impact of not having enough 
personnel to support the various procurement demands of the government (GAO, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2009, 2010).   Many of the older reports argued that 
reducing the size of the workforce would not save the government much money 
because those services would then have to be contracted out to private industry at a 
premium (GAO, 1995, 1996).  Additionally, those former acquisition personnel 
simply moved to other parts of the DoD (GAO, 1998).  In 2003, the GAO issued a 
report that analyzed workforce trends relative to spending from 1997–2001 and 
found that while the acquisition workforce was reduced by roughly 5%, spending on 
goods and services rose by roughly 11% (GAO, 2003).  The same study concluded 
that although size is an important variable to keep in mind, the knowledge and skills 
required to meet the complex challenges of tomorrow’s systems is an equally 
important—if not more important—means of achieving successful acquisitions. 
Lastly, as we have illustrated earlier, researchers have found that 
commitment, trust, communication, satisfaction, and performance are higher in 
relational exchanges than in transactional exchanges.  Hence, an important question 
for future research is, how can government acquisitions that require formal contacts 
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Figure 4. Workforce Figures 






















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 31 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 






















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 33 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 






































do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  -  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
References 
Achrol, R. S., & Gundlach, G. T. (1999). Legal and social safeguards against 
opportunism in exchange. Journal of Retailing, 75(1), 107–124. 
Aldrich. (1979). 
Arrol, L. G. (1993). Low density materiel acquisition and sustainment on the 
battlefield. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College. 
AT&L Workforce DataMart & DMDC. 
Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S. (1999). Procurement contracts: Fixed price vs. cost plus 
(Working Paper 99006). Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Department of 
Economics. 
Bennett, R. (1996). Relationship formation and governance in consumer markets: 
Transactional analysis versus the behaviourist approach. Journal of 
Marketing Management, 12(5), 417–436. 
Berrios, R. (2006). Government contracts and contractor behavior. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 63, 119–130. 
Blanchard, B. S. (1967). Cost effectiveness, system effectiveness, integrated 
logistics support, and maintainability. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, R-
16(3), 117–126. 
Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, & Simpson. (1992). 
Bradach, J. L., & Eccles, R. G. (1989). Price, authority, and trust. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 15, 97–118. 
Cannon, J. P., Achrol, R. S., & Gundlach, G. T. (2000, Spring). Contracts, norms, 
and plural form governance. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
28(2), 180–194. 
Chao, P. (2005). 
Child. (1972). 
Cooper, R. G., & Kleinschmidt, E. J. (1987). Success factors in product innovation. 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  -  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
DeCottis, T. A., & Dyer, L. (1979). Defining and measuring project performance. 
Research Management, 22, 17–22. 
Defense Acquisition University.  
Dehoog, R. H. (1990). Competition, negotiation, or cooperation. Administration & 
Society, 22(3), 317–340. 
Drezner, J. A. (2009). Competition and innovation under complexity. In G. Ben-Ari & 
P. A. Chao (Eds.), Organizing for a complex world: Developing tomorrow's 
defense and net-centric systems (pp. 31–49). Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. 
Driessnack, J. D., & King, D. R. (2004). An initial look at technology and institutions 
on defense industry consolidation. Defense Acquisition Review Journal, 35, 
62–77. 
Dvir, D., Lipovetsky, S., Shenhar, A. J., & Tishler, A. (2003). What is really important 
for project success? A refined, multivariate, comprehensive analysis. 
International Journal of Management and Decision Making, 4(4), 382–404. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2010). 
Fehr, E., Gachter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a contract 
enforcement device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica, 65(4), 833–860. 
Ferrara, J. (1996, Fall). DOD 5000 documents: Evolution and change in defense 
acquisition policy. Acquisition Review Quarterly, 109–130. 
Freeman, M., & Beale, P. (1992). Measuring project success. Project Management 
Journal, 23(1), 8–17. 
Garrett, G. A. (2002, April 1). Performance-based contracting incentives: Myths, best 
practices, and innovations. Retrieved from 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article/print/1G1-85048533 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1995). 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1996). 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1998). 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1999). THAAD restructure addresses problems 
but limits early capability. Washington, DC: Author. 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (2000). Trends, reforms, and challenges. 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  -  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (2002). Department of Defense's plans to address 
workforce size and structure challenges. Washington, DC: Author. 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (2003). Spending and workforce trends. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost 
theory. The Academy of Management Review, 21, (1), 13–47. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009). Actions needed to overcome long-
standing challenges with weapon systems acquisition and service contract 
management. Washington, DC: Author. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2010). Observations on weapon program 
performance and acquisition reforms. Washington, DC: Author. 
Gruber, M. B. (1999). Sustainment: Making it better—A focus on organic depots. 
Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, Air Command and Staff College. 
Gundlach, G. T. (1996, Fall). Exchange relationships and the efficiency interests of 
the law. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 15(2), 185–202. 
Gundlach, G. T., & Achrol, R. S. (1993, Fall). Governance in exchange: Contract law 
and its alternatives. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 12(2), 141–155. 
Gundlach, G. T., & Murphy, P. E. (1993, October). Ethical and legal foundations of 
relational marketing exchanges. Journal of Marketing, 57, 35–46. 
Holtz, H. (1979). Government contracts: Proposalmanship and winning strategies. 
New York, NY: Plenum Press. 
Joskow, P. L. (1988, Spring). Asset specificity and the structure of vertical 
relationships: Empirical evidence. Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, 4(1), 95–117. 
Kapstein, E. B., & Oudot, J.-M. (2009). Reforming defense procurement: Lessons 
from France. Business and Politics, 11(2), 1–25. 
Kaufmann, P. J., & Stern, L. W. (1988). Relational exchange norms, perceptions of 
unfairness, and retained hostility in commercial litigation. Journal of Conflict 
Management, 32(3), 534–552. 
Kebede, E., Maytorena, E., Lowe, D., & Winch, G. (2009). UK defence acquisition 
process for NEC: Transaction governance within an integrated project team 
(NPS-AM-09-050). In Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Acquisition Research 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  -  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
Kim, I.-G. (1998). A model of selective tendering: Does bidding competition deter 
opportunism by contractors? Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 
38(4), 907–926. 
Lenk. (1977). 
Lipovetsky, S., Tishler, A., Dvir, D., & Shenhar, A. (1997). The relative importance of 
project success dimensions. R&D Management, 27(2), 97–106. 
Macneil, I. R. (1978). Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic relations under 
classical, neo-classical, and relational contract law. Northwestern University 
Law Review, 72, 854–905. 
Macneil, I. R. (1980). The new social contract. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Ministry of Defence (MoD). (2005). 
Peck, M. J., & Scherer, F. M. (1962). The weapons acquisition process: An 
economic analysis. Boston, MA: Harvard University. 
Pegnato, J. A. (2003). Assessing federal procurement reforms: Has the procurement 
pendulum stopped swinging? Journal of Public Procurement, 3(2), 145–175. 
Pinto, J. K., & Slevin, D. P. (1988). Critical success factors across the project life 
cycle. Project Management Journal, 19(3), 67–75. 
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance 
function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23, 
707–725. 
Rogerson, W. P. (1994). Economic incentives and the defense procurement 
process. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(4), 65–90. 
Rooks, G., Raub, W., Selten, R., & Tazelaar, F. (2000). How inter-firm cooperation 
depends on social embeddedness: A vignette study. ACTA Sociologica, 43 , 
123–137. 
Sadeh, A., Dvir, D., & Shenhar, A. (2000). The role of contract type in the success of 
R&D defense projects under increasing uncertainty. Project Management 
Journal, 31(3), 14–22. 
Scherer, F. M. (1964). The weapons acquisition process: Economic incentives. 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  -  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
Sheng, S., Brown, J. R., Nicholson, C. Y., & Poppo, L. (2006). Do exchange hazards 
always foster relational governance? An empirical test of the role of 
communication. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 23, 63–77. 
Simon, H. A. (1961). Administrative behavior (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Macmillian. 
Smith, G. K., & Friedmann, E. T. (1980). An analysis of weapon system acquisition 
intervals, past and present. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
Tishler, A., Dvir, D., Shenhar, A., & Lipovetsky, S. (1996). Identifying critical success 
factors in defense development projects: A multivariate analysis. 
Technological Forecasting and Change, 51, 151–171. 
Tubig, S. B., & Abetti, P. A. (1990, February). Variables influencing the performance 
of defense R&D contractors. IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management, 37, 22–30. 
Watts, B. D. (2008). The US defense industrial base: Past, present and future. 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York, NY: 
The Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1998). Transaction cost economics: How it works; where it is 
headed. De Economist, 146, 23–58. 
Williamson, O. E. (2002, Summer). The theory of the firm as governance structure: 













do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  -  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  -  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
2003 - 2011 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  -  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-term Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  -  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 
=
=
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
